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Boeckman: Boeckman: War on Insider Trading

NOTES
THE WAR ON INSIDER TRADING:
IS FIGHTING OVER "OFFICER"
A LOSING BATTLE?
C.R.A. Realty Corp. v Crotty'

Reproposed SEC Rule 16a-l(f)2

I. INTRODUCTION
[Tihe president of a corporation testified that he and his brothers
controlled the company with a little over 10 percent of the shares; that
shortly before the company passed a dividend, they disposed of their
holdings for upward of $16 million and later, repurchased them for
about $7 million, showing a profit of approximately $9 million on the
transaction. 3
Examples of flagrant, inequitable trading by corporate insiders, as
in the case above, permeated the 1934 report of the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee. Congress was prompted to enact section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act).4 The goal was to deter
corporate insiders from abusing their positions of trust to enhance their
personal trading profits at the expense of their shareholders.5 Section
16 is the only provision in the federal securities laws explicitly designed

1. 878 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1989).
2. 54 Fed. Reg. 35,667 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(f))
(reproposed Aug. 18, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Revised Proposal]; see also 21 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1323, 1343 (Aug. 25, 1989).
The 1989 proposal was a revision of a 1988 proposal. See 53 Fed. Reg.
49,997 (1988) (proposed Dec. 13, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Proposal].
3. S.REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
5. The preface to section 16(b) states that the section is aimed at "preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by [a corporate
insider] by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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the unfair use of nonpublic information by corporate
to regulate
6
insiders.
Section 16 "represents a threefold attack upon possible abuses of
inside information by corporate insiders."7 Section 16(a) requires every
officer or director of a company with an equity security registered under
section 12 of the Act, as well as every person who is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10% ' of any class of any
such equity security, to report her stockholdings and transactions in her
companies' securities to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).8 Section 16(c) makes it unlawful for insiders to engage in "short
sales" of their companies' equity securities.
The cause of action created by section 16(b) allows any shareholder
or the corporation to bring suit to force an insider, anyone listed in
section 16(a) who is required to register transactions, to disgorge profits
made on a purchase and sale or a sale and purchase within a six month
period of his or her companies' equity securities. Because the sales and
purchases must occur within six months, transactions to which section
16(b) liability attaches are referred to as "short-swing profit
transactions." Section 16(b) states in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within a
period of less than six months, ... shall inure to, and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial owner, director, or officer on entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security
sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit
may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer
in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse
to bring such suit within sixty' days after request or shall fail
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter ....

6. The other statutory provisions of the federal securities laws that are used
to combat insider trading are general anti-fraud provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i, j (1988) (sections 9 and 10 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
7. 3B H. BLOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CoRPORATE LAW 10-12
(rev. ed. 1978).
8. The Securities and Exchange Commission is the agency charged with
principal responsibility for the enforcement and administration of the federal
secarities laws.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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The most distinctive feature of section 16 is that it establishes
objective standards of unacceptable insider trading conduct. Indeed, in
the 1934 hearings before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
an administration spokesperson described section 16(b) as a "crude rule
of thumb."'1 No analysis is required and no defense is permitted to
determine whether the designated insiders actually took unfair
advantage of their positions or were in possession of any nonpublic
material information when they traded.
This approach clearly
simplifies enforcement of the trading prohibitions. In doing so, it
creates a sharp contrast with the increasingly complex insider trading
litigation under section 10(b) of the Act. For example, issues of
fiduciary duty, scienter, materiality, reliance, and causation-which
often are critical in applying the antifraud prohibitions in section
10(b)-are irrelevant to an analysis using section 16. Yet, it is section
10(b) of the Act that has emerged over the years as the primary tool for
restricting insider abuses."
Recent litigation and discussion of section 16 has focused mostly in
the area of unorthodox transactions-the acquisition or disposition of
stock by merger, of convertible securities, and of stock rights and
options.' 2 In analyzing these "unorthodox" transactions, the emphasis
of the early courts on an objective approach shifted over the years to a
subjective or "pragmatic" analysis. 13 The essence of this pragmatic
view of section 16(b) is that, in unorthodox transactions, a case-by-case
factual analysis must be made to determine whether there exists the
14
possibility for speculative abuse to which section 16(a) is directed.

10. 15 Stock Exchange Practices,Hearingsbefore Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran). This characterization was approved in Booth v. Varian Assocs., 334 F.2d
1, 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1964).
11. Committee on FederalRegulationof Securities,Report on the Task Force
on Regulation of Insider TradingPart II: Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAW.
1087, 1091 (1987) [hereinafter Committee on FederalRegulation of Securities].
The Committee is part of the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business
Law of the American Bar Association.
12. See Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretationof Section 16(b) and the
Need for Clarification, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 772 (1971); Hazen, The New
Pragmatismunder Section 16(b) of the SecuritiesExchange Act, 54 N.C.L. REv.
1 (1975); Lang & Katz, Section 16(b) and 'Extraordinary' Transactions:
Corporate Reorganizations and Stock Options, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 705
(1974).
13. Comment, Section 16(b) of the Securities and [si ExchangeAct of 1934:
Is a Vice Presidentan Officer? 58 NEB. L. REv. 733, 737 (1979).
14. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582 (1973); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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analysis to factual situations
Recent cases have applied the subjective
5
not involving unorthodox transactions.'
Consistent with the development of a pragmatic approach, the
courts have applied A subjective definition in determining who is an
officer for purposes of imposing section 16(b) liability. Generally, such
a subjective test focuses on the officer's job duties and potential access
to inside information. C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Crotty involves the
application of this subjective definition to an officer confronted with
insider trading charges. The approach of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Crotty, however, is significant because the court focuses
almost exclusively on the officer's potential access to inside information,
and hence, distinguishes itself as the most subjective test a court has
applied to the determination of officer status.
Pursuant to the authority granted by Congress in the Act,' 6 the
SEC enacted rule 3b-2, which provided a listing of employees qualifying
as an officer for purposes of section 16(b). 17 But, the courts chose to
rebuke the power of the SEC to define officer,' 8 and instead, relied
upon a subjective definition in contrast to the objectivity of rule 3b-2.
In 1989, the SEC responded to the courts' challenges and proposed a
definition which, besides listing specific employees qualifying for officer
status, focused on whether the employee's position was one with
executive policy-making functions.' Although it offers less objectivity
than the original listing, the revision still avoids the courts' subjective
inquiry into access to inside information.

denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
15. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975) (no liability without opportunity for
speculative abuse); Pier 1 Imports v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(no liability despite a voluntary sale of securities pursuant to a merger by an
insider who had no access to inside information); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule:
The PragmaticApproach to Section 16(b) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934,
70 Nw. L. REv. 221,223 (1975) ("the pragmatic approach can and should be used
in all applications of 16(b)").
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1983) ("The Commission... shall have power by
rules and regulations to define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms
used in this chapter, consistently with the provisions and purposes of this
chapter."); 15. U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1983) ("The Commission... shall ... have
power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate
to implement the provisions of this title.., and may for such purposes clarify
persons .... ).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1988).
18. For discussion of the authority of the SEC to issue rule 3b-2, see infra
notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
19. See 1989 Revised Proposal, supra note 2.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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After examining the differences between the objective definition of
the SEC and the subjective approach as manifested in Crotty, this Note
discusses the impact of such a disparity. Because of the benefits a
uniform approach offers to combating insider trading, the courts are
urged to heed the authority of the SEC and adopt the proposed revision
to rule 3b-2. Although Congress designed section 16 to prevent the kind
of trading described at the beginning of this Note, abuse of inside
information still occurs today' ° and leaving the definitional differences
unresolved contributes to the continuation of such trading.

II. THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF CROTTY
From December 19, 1984 to July 24, 1985, Joseph Crotty, while a
vice president at United Artists, Inc. (United Artists), purchased 7,500
shares of United Artists stock and sold 3,500 shares, realizing a profit
of $66,620.21 C.R.A. Realty Corporation (C.R.A.) brought suit under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to compel Crotty to
disgorge this profit.'

20. According to one commentator:
Experts who track trading by corporate insiders can point to many
cases where the insiders bought ahead of the good news and bailed
out before the bad news. Earlier this year, executives at several
major computer companies-including Data General, Digital Equipment, and Wang Laboratories-were heavy sellers of shares before
disclosure of earnings disappointments, layoffs, and sluggish sales.
Laderman, The Epidemic of Insider Trading,Bus. WEEK, Apr. 29, 1985, at 88.
21. C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. 444, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd, 878 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1989). The transactions were as follows:
December 19, 1984-purchased 2,500 shares at $9.62 per share;
January 17, 1985-sold 1,500 shares at $26.13 per share;
July 10, 1985-purchased 5,000 shares at $4.81 per share;
July 10, 1985-sold 1,000 shares at $20.88 per share;
July 24, 1985--sold 1,000 shares at $23.38 per share.
Id.
The district court calculated Crotty's short-swing profit as $59,405. Id.
The court apparently matched the 5,000 shares bought at $4.81 against the
3,500 shares sold at the three different prices. Since Crotty sold only 3,500
shares, the profit should be calculated based on the purchase of 3,500 shares,
not 5,000 shares. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 560

(2d ed. 1988).
22. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 445. C.R.A. also named United Artists as a
defendant in the suit. Since United Artists was an unnecessary party, it was
rightfully ignored throughout the litigation. Id.
C.R.A. is "an organization incorporated to act as a private attorney general
to purchase stock and commence actions against corporate officials for violations
of the federal securities laws." Crotty, 878 F.2d at 564. Because C.R.A. bought
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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The only contested issue was whether Crotty was an officer for
purposes of section 16(b), as both parties apparently acknowledged the
transaction as being appropriate for short-swing profit liability. 23
Crotty, adopting the subjective approach as set forth in several federal
court of appeal cases,2 claimed his title was merely honorary and that
C.R.A. contended that
he had no access to inside information.2
Crotty's title of vice president was sufficient alone to qualify him as a
section 16(b) insider.2 1 C.R.A.'s position followed the objective definition of officer provided in SEC rule 3b-2.' The plaintiff argued in the
alternative that, under Crotty's subjective approach, he was still an
officer because he did have access to inside information.2
If Crotty prevailed and the court applied a subjective approach, the
facts surrounding Crotty's employment at United Artists would be
crucial. A United Artists employee since 1969,2 Crotty became head
film buyer in 1980 for the corporation's western division.' ° In 1982 the
promotion was not
board of directors elected him vice president.3' The
32
accompanied by any changes in salary or duties.
Crotty and his staff of thirty were responsible for buying and
distributing films for the ninety-three United Artists theaters in the
western division states. 33 He had virtually complete and autonomous

10 shares of United Artists stock in 1986, it had shareholder status and had
standing to sue Crotty. C.R.A. was unsuccessful in convincing United Artists
to proceed against Crotty. Id
23. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 444.
24. See infratext accompanying notes 51-87.
25. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 444-45.
26. C.R.A. Realty Corp v. Crotty, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,140 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1982).
28. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 447.
29. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 564.
30. Id- United Artists, at the time of Crotty's short-swing transactions, was
divided into three divisions: western, southwestern, and eastern. Each division
had a head film buyer. The corporation is now structured differently. Id.
31. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 445.
32. Id at 444. Furthermore, Crotty was not a director of the company,
never attended or was asked to attend a board of directors meeting, and never
received any non-public information from the board. Id.
33. Id The appellate opinion stated there were 351 "movie screens." Crotty,
878 F.2d at 564. The western division states were California, Nevada,
Washington, Idaho, Arizona and Utah. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 445.
Specifically, Crotty's duties included negotiating and signing agreements,
pursuant to which United Artists obtained movies for exhibitions, supervising
their distribution, and settling contracts when the movies' "runs" were
completed. Crotty also helped supervise the western division's advertising
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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control of the division's film buying.3 The sole corporate official he
reported to was the president; a5 he did this only if he wanted to exceed
a predetermined limit for a cash advance to a distributor.
Crotty received from Entertainment Data, Inc., an independent
contractor, an accounting of the daily gross revenue receipts for United
Artists films in the western division.3 7 The gross revenue from
Crotty's division was routinely about 35-36% of United Artists' gross
revenue from movie exhibitions.'
This amounted to around 15-18%
of the company's total gross revenue. 39
The district court initially addressed the issue of Crotty's status as
an officer when it denied defendant's motion to dismiss and denied the
summary judgment motions of both parties. Indicating that it is usually
inapproriate to resolve such an issue in a summary judgment, ° the
court denied the motions because of insufficient
proof of Crotty's access
41
or lack of access to confidential information.
The trial resulted in the dismissal of C.R.A.'s complaint. 42 The
district court held that the evidence revealed that Crotty was a middle
management employee whose duties did not provide access to confidential information about the company's financial plans or its future

department. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 564.
34. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 564.
35. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 445.
36. Id. This occurred only two or three times per year. Crotty, 878 F.2d at
564.
37. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 567. In addition to giving this overnight data to
Crotty, Entertainment Data, Inc. gave the information to most major movie
exhibitors and distributors in Los Angeles and San Francisco, as well as to
several daily trade publications. Id.
38. Id. at 564. In fiscal year 1985, the western division's revenue totaled
$86,497,000, or 36.6% of the $236,422,000 in total theater revenue. Crotty, 663
F. Supp. at 445.
39. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 564. The 1985 revenues were 18.2% of the
$476,062,000 of total corporate revenue. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 445.
40. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 446-47. The district court was confident,
however, that determination of the issue rested on whether Crotty had access
to inside information. The court never discussed the applicability of rule 3b-2,
but instead focused on the approach set forth in Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1949). Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 446-47.
41. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 447. The court stated that evidence of Crotty's
knowledge of United Artists' daily gross revenue receipts was not sufficient for
a determination of access to inside information. Id.
42. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,141 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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operations.4" The court's conclusion appeared to be based on Crotty's
complete lack of involvement with the board of directors, the autonomous nature of his job and the lack of an accompanying change in
salary or duties upon his promotion.'
The district court's ruling that Crotty's duties did not provide access
to inside information was upheld in a 2-1 decision by a panel of the
Second Circuit.45 The court held that it was the duties or functions of
an employee-especially his access to inside information-rather than
his corporate title that determined whether the liability provision of
section 16(b) applied.4"
III. PAST TREATMENT OF OFFICER STATUS
DETERMINATIONS
A. In the Beginning
Although the term "director" is defined in the Act,47 Congress did
not provide a definition of the term "officer." Therefore, the SEC
adopted rule 3b-2,4" which currently defines "officer:" "A president,
vice president, secretary, treasurer or principal financial officer,
comptroller or principal accounting officer, and any person routinely
performing corresponding functions with49respect to any organization
whether incorporated or unincorporated."
In establishing an objective approach to defining officer, the SEC
interpreted rule 3b-2 to mean that a determination of officer status

43. Id The evidence presented by C.R.A. consisted solely of testimony that
Crotty's job title was that of vice president. Id
44. Id at 1 94,140-141.
45. Crotty,878 F.2d at 563. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Oakes and
Circuit Judges Timbers (majority) and Meskill (dissenting).
46. Id. at 567. The court found that Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.
1949), required the plaintiff to establish that it was more likely than not that
the duties of the trader provided access to inside information. Id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1982) defines director as: "Any director of a
corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any
organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated."
48. See supranote 16 for the authority pursuant to which the SEC acted in
adopting rule 3b-2.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1982). The rule originally read: "A president, vice
president, secretary, treasurer, comptroller, and any other person who performs
for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding
to those performed by the foregoing officers." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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°
depended upon the actual performance of the duties of that office.
Consideration of the individual's access to inside information was not
included in the SEC definition.
In Colby v. Klune5 1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
questioned the authority of the SEC to issue such a confining rule, and
proceeded to formulate a broader test which it considered to be more
sympathetic with the purposes of the Act. The trial court had granted
the defendant's summary judgment motion on the grounds that the
defendant was not an officer because of his title of production manager.5 2 In reversing the district court, the court of appeals assumed
"for the moment" that rule 3b-2 was not authorized by the statute and
gave its own construction of the term "officer":5

It includes, inter alia, a corporate employee performing important
executive duties of such character that he would .be likely, in
discharging these duties, to obtain confidential information about the
company's affairs that would aid him if he engaged in personal market
transactions. It is immaterial how his functions are labelled or how
defined in the by-laws ....
This "momentary assumption" became one of the main sources of
confusion in the line of cases dealing with the officer question, causing
later courts to question rule 3b-2.' Furthermore, although the court

50. Statement of the Commission Respecting Distinctions, Exchange Act
Release No. 2687, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,967, 10,981-82 (Sept. 27, 1940), provides in
part:
[A]n assistant would be an "officer" if his chief is so inactive that the
assistant is really performing his chiefs functions. However, an
assistant, although performing some functions which might be those
of his chief, would not be an "officer" so long as those duties were
under the supervision of his chief.... Subject to the foregoing, assistant treasurers, assistant secretaries, and assistant comptrollers, for
example, are not to be considered "officers" for the purposes of this
definition.
51. 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
52. 83 F. Supp. 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
53. Colby, 178 F.2d at 873. The court felt that the plaintiff should be
allowed to produce evidence at trial relevant to the new definition. Id.
54. Id..
55. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d
1119 (9th Cir. 1978); Morales v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Gold
v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom.
Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Gold v.
Scurlock, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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of appeals specifically reserved judgment on the Commission's statutory
authority to issue rule 3b-2,' the result created a judicial definition
focusing on access and requiring a subjective analysis. On the other
hand, the definition of officer in rule 3b-2 simply enumerated specific
employees, including anyone else performing corresponding functions.
Thus, despite the SEC's approach emphasizing objectivity,57 both
approaches still served to find non-officers, who were officers in
substance, liable.58
Two federal district court cases in California, both following closely
on the heels of Colby, held that rule 3b-2 was a valid exercise of SEC
power and disregarded as dictum the test proposed in Colby. 9 Both
cases involved determinations about whether assistant officers were

It seems clear that the rule is within the statutory power of the SEC to
make rules and regulations, and no court has held that the rule is invalid.
Indeed, the court's "assumption of invalidity was relegated to the purest form
of dictum by the court's conclusion that the granting of the summary judgment
would have been erroneous even if the rule were valid." Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See infra text accompanying
notes 171-73.
56. Colby, 178 F.2d at 873.
57. According to the Colby opinion, the memorandum filed by the SEC
stated that an employee's responsibility for policy and his or her participation
in executive councils are factors for determining officer status. Id. at 875.
Because of the Second Circuit's indifference to the Commission's interpretations, the SEC sought to amend its definition to more closely resemble the Colby
approach. See Report of Directors, Officers, and Principal Stockholders,
Exchange Act Release No. 4718, 17 Fed. Reg. 5674 (June 24, 1952). Because the
comments received on the proposal were overwhelmingly negative, however, the
Commission decided not to adopt it and simply await further judicial expression.
Report of Directors, Officers, and Principal Stockholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 4754, 17 Fed. Reg. 8900, 8901 (Oct. 4, 1952). The comments expressed
disapproval of the additional proof that would be required and the uncertainty
accompanying such an approach. Id.
58. Colby was truly in the spirit of section 16. The commentators generally
have supported the opinion. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 741.
According to one commentator, the holding "was necessary to avoid making
section 16(b) an empty shell enabling all but a very few employees of any
corporation to be exempt through a purposeful structuring of corporate titles."
Comment, supra note 13, at 741.
59. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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liable. Although each employed a more objective test than Colby,6°
neither decision was given much consideration by later courts.
B.

The Expansion Years

Four cases decided in 197361 adopted the subjective approach
proferred in Colby and applied it to the converse factual situation: a
titled officer attempting to escape section 16(b) liability because he or
she was not an officer in substance. 62 The Commission, again advocating an objective approach to determining officer status, believed an
officer by title had to be found liable because the definition of officer in
rule 3b-2 was satisfied. 63 According to the SEC, under rule 3b-2 there
could be a factual inquiry into the functions performed by a person, but
only when the person was not titled an officer. 64
Although each of the four cases from 1973 grappled with whether
to apply an objective or subjective approach, all of the cases agreed with
the proposition that an officer by title was not liable if he was not an
T6 5
officer in substance. Schimmel v. Goldman
and Selas Corp. of

60. Rathman interpreted rule 3b-2 to relate to officers, regardless of title,
whose functions corresponded to one of the officers enumerated in the rule.
Rathman, 106 F. Supp. at 813. Campbell departed somewhat from the strict
objectivity of Rathman and allowed evidence concerning the nature of the
defendant's duties. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. at 285. The court concluded that
the nonofficer defendant was not a section 16(b) officer under either the
Commission's definition or Colby's definition. Id.
61. Morales v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Selas
Corp. of America v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Schimmel v.
Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Gold v. Scurlock, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
62. Colby only addressed whether a nonofficer, who in substance was an
officer, could be liable under section 16(b). Comment, supra note 13, at 741.
One commentator has argued that the 1973 cases erroneously applied the Colby
test, because the fact situations before the courts in 1973 were far different than
that before the Colby court. Id. at 745. The commentator believed Colby was
correctly decided because it addressed the problem of officers avoiding shortswing profit liability by simply changing formal job titles. Id. He asserted,
however, that applying Colby to the reverse fact situation was unsound because
such a problem was not presented when an officer in title claimed not to be an
officer in substance. Id.
63. Id. at 744-45.
64. Id.
65. 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Schimmel approved a settlement partly
because a factual question existed about whether the vice president was an
insider for section 16(b) purposes. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 21

308

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

America v. Voogd 6 applied both the Colby and the SEC reasoning in
analyzing whether the officer defendants were within the parameters of
section 16(b). The two other cases, Gold v. Scurlocke7 and Morales v.
Holiday Inns, Inc.,' applied subjective Colby-like tests, and inquired
whether access to confidential information was likely because of the
officers' duties.
9
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. Livingston,3 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the position of the SEC and
adopted an approach similar to that offered by Colby. The court held
that the title "Vice President" only created an inference that the person
holding the title had the executive duties and the opportunities for
confidential information that the title implied.7 ° The inference could
be overcome by proof that the title was merely honorary and did not
carry with it any of the executive responsibilities that might otherwise
be assumed.7 ' In determining whether the defendant's title was
merely honorary the Livingston court, like the Colby court, inquired into
the access to inside information. 2 The Livingston court, however,
modified the Colby approach by initially focusing on whether the title
of the officer was honorary.

66. 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Selas granted summary judgment
for the corporation because, under either approach, the vice president defendant
was liable. Id
67. 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd on othergroundssub nom. Gold
v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Gold v. Scurlock,
419 U.S. 873 (1974). Goldwas reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
because the purchase transaction (a merger) was not a purchase for purposes of
section 16(b). Before the appellate court decided the case, however, other courts,
including Schimmel and Selas,relied on the district court opinion. Additionally,
the Ninth Circuit misapplied the appellate decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1978).
68. 366 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The district court in Morales held
that the vice president's claim that he was not an officer within the meaning of
section 16(b) was lacking in merit; consequently, the court refused to approve
a settlement between the plaintiff corporation and the defendant. Id. at 762-63.
69. 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978).
70. Id. at 1122.
71. Id. The court'stated that confidential information is information about
the company's affairs that would help the employee make decisions affecting his
market transactions in the company stock. Confidential information does not
mean simply any information not available to the public. Id at 1122-23.
72. Id. at 1121. The defendant in Livingston was one of 48 persons who
were account executives but who had been awarded the title of vice president
as part of an "Account Executive Recognition Program" without a change of their
account executive duties. The company had 350 "executive vice presidents" who
performed executive and managerial functions. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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In 1981, responding to the confusion generated by the four 1973
cases, particularly Livingston, the Commission revised its interpretation
of rule 3b-2. 3 The SEC formally recognized that determination of
74
officer status "hinge[d] on an examination of all the relevant facts."
Although refusing to revise rule 3b-2 (because each case depended upon
its own facts), the SEC did agree that, for section 16(b) purposes,
officers could be non-officers due to insignificant functions, and nonofficers could be officers due to significant functions.75
The release expressly supported Livingston.7 6 It stated that if a
vice president was so in name only (one who had no significant duties
and who did not participate in the company management), and had no
access to inside information, then he or she was not an officer for section
16(b) purposes.77 Thus, the SEC did approve of a subjective inquiry
into access to inside information; however, the SEC interpretation still
focused primarily on an employee's functions.
C. Full Bloom
The 1981 release by the SEC offered the possibility that perhaps
the courts would retreat from their subjective inquiry into an officer's
access to confidential information, and adopt the mostly objective test
of the SEC, which focused on the employee's functions. But three cases
decided since the 1981 release ignored the flexible approach set forth in
the release, and instead followed the subjective inquiries established in
Colby and Livingston."

73. Interpretation Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and
Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 18114, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,147, 48,148-49 (Oct.
1, 1981).
74. Id
75. I&
76. Id77. I&
78. Three other cases since the 1981 SEC release considered issues similar,
but not analytically helpful, to those raised in officer status cases. In Pier One
Imports of Georgia, Inc. v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 239, 243 (N.D. Tex. 1981), the
court concluded that the defendant's "unorthodox transaction," a sale of stock in
connection with a tender offer, did not present an opportunity for speculative
abuse. Id Hence, the defendant was not liable for profits made on the
transaction. The court found there was no opportunity for speculative abuse
mostly because of the honorary nature of defendant's position as vice president.
IdIn Sullair Corp. v. Hoodes, 672 F. Supp. 337, 338 (N.D. Ill. 1987), the court
held that the former chairman of the board and CEO was liable for short-swing
profits, notwithstanding the corporation's decision to terminate the officer three
days prior to the initial sale. The court said the defendant's ability to gain
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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In NationalMedical Enterprises,Inc. v. Small," the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals supported Livingston's subjective inquiry into access
to inside information to determine section 16(b) liability. But the court
restricted its Livingston test to "a very limited exception applicable only
where the title is essentially honorary or ceremonial."80 The court
reasoned that Livingston did not require a case by case detailed factual
81
inquiry into an officer's actual access to confidential information.
Only if evidence existed that the officer's title was honorary, was there
an examination inth the officer's access to inside information. 2 Hence,
the court, finding the defendants' titles to be non-honorary, upheld the
summary judgment against the vice presidents, even though they
claimed to have no access to inside information. 3 Although still
allowing a subjective inquiry to take place, the Ninth Circuit, after
Small, required a defendant officer to present evidence that his or her
title was honorary before any inquiry into access occurred.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Winston v. FederalExpress
Corp.,8 followed the original Ninth Circuit approach set forth in
Livingston. Unlike Small's requirement of evidence of an honorary title,
this approach focuses on access to inside information to determine if the
title is honorary. The Winston court stated that an exception to the rule
that the employee's title determined insider status existed when the
title was essentially honorary or ceremonial.8 5 Determining the nature
of the title depended upon the employee's access to insider information.8 Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Livingston, the Sixth Circuit, to
overcome the presumption of access, required substantial evidence that
there was no possible access to inside information. 7 Winston and

access to inside information at the time of the sale was "completely irrelevant."
Id. at 338.
In Jammies Int'l, Inc. v. Nowinski, 700 F. Supp. 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
the defendant argued for summary judgment on the grounds that he was not an
insider because his title of vice president was purely honorary. The court
acknowledged Livingston and Colby, and denied the motion because resolution
of the issue depended on factual questions. Id79. 680 F.2d 83, 84 (9th Cir. 1982).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 853 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 456-57.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 457. The defendant vice president ceased performing duties for
the corporation on August 27th, and his resignation was effective on September
30th. He purchased stock on September 30th; then, on March 26th, he sold the
shares for a profit in excess of $176,000. I& at 456.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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Small represent variations on the subjective approaches originally
established by Colby and Livingston; however, the inquiries demanded
by each case are resolved ultimately by focusing on the officer's access
to inside information.
The district court for the Northern District of Illinois, in C.R.A.
Realty Corp. v. System Software Associates,' granted summary
judgment for C.R.A. on the issue of whether the defendant was an
officer for purposes of section 16(b).89 The defendant, in performing
the functions of comptroller, was not vested with any executive duties,
but did have access to the company's financial records. 9°
The court analyzed the defendant's officer status according to the'
three approaches it deemed available. Under the test promulgated by
the SEC in rule 3b-2, the defendant was obviously an officer because the
rule expressly provides that comptrollers are officers. 9 ' The court
ignored the 1981 release recognizing that functions also can be
considered. According to the test approved by the Ninth Circuit in
Small, the defendant was an officer because his title was not honorary
or ceremonial.92 Finally, the court analyzed the defendant's status
under Colby's access to inside information test. Although agreeing that
the Colby approach offered the defendant a much stronger argument,
the court still found him to be an officer due to the financial records to
93
which he had access.
Although the System Software court must be commended for such
an accurate and comprehensive analysis involving each of the approaches for determining officer status, the case reflected the state of confusion
existing about how to determine officer liability. Consequently, in an
effort to resolve the difference existing between the approaches, the SEC
proposed rule 16a-l(f). 94 The proposed rule was released in August of
1989, as part of the first comprehensive review of the section 16

The court, upholding the trial court's determination, found that the
defendant produced no evidence that, after he quit, the company had shielded
him from the potential access to confidential information his old job provided.
Id- at 456-57.
88. No. 88 C-0052 (N.D. Il. Feb. 1, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 W.L. 8508).
89. Id. at 1.
90. Id. at 2-3.
91. Id. at6.
92. Id.
93. Id at 7.
94. 1989 Revised Proposal, supra note 2, at 1325.
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regulatory scheme.". The proposed rule' defines officer for section
16 purposes according to the rule 3b-7 definition of "executive officer":
The term officer shall mean an issuer's president, principal financial
officer, controller or principal accounting officer, any vice-president of
the issuer in charge of principal business unit, division or function
(such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer who
performs a policy-making function or any other person who performs
similar policy-making functions for the issuer ....
Besides more specifically listing the officers qualifying for section 16(b)
liability, the proposal changes the focus from the emphasis in rule 3b-2
on "any person ... performing corresponding functions" to an emphasis
98
on any person performing executive policy-making functions.
The release restates the Commission's 1981 position that title alone
is not determinative.9 The revised definition is a reflection of the
Commission's concern that the rule 3b-2 definition is inaccurate and
overly broad, especially when considering that section 16(b) is designed,
in its opinion, to apply to officers with access to inside information and
not necessarily to those with particular titles. 1°° The SEC reasoned

95. 1988 Proposal, supranote 2, at 49,998. The Commission offered various
reasons for the proposed changes to section 16. See id at 49,999-50,000. Most
important was the changing nature of securities, as evidenced by the mushrooming of trading in both old and new derivative securities. Id- Similarly, employee
benefit programs have become more widespread, complex, and diverse. According to the SEC, the developments have not fit easily into the 1934
regulatory framework, resulting in "interpretive uncertainty, substantial litigation, and, in some instances, unnecessary regulatory burdens." Id- at 49,998.
The complexity of the section was blamed for the delinquency rate in excess of
40% in required transaction reports in 1986, 1987, and 1988 and for the
difficulty in detecting these delinquent filers. Id at 50,000.
The changes appear to be aimed at making the application of section 16
simpler and more reasonable. If such goals are accomplished, enforcement by
the SEC might be easier and more justifiable.
96. The revised definition was originally rule 16a-l(g). It was relocated to
rule 16a-l(f) for easier reference. The proposed revision of the officer definition
received more comments aftdr the 1988 Proposal than after any of the other
section 16 proposals. 1989 Revised Proposal, supra note 2, at 1325. The
comments generally were concerned with the narrowing of the definition. Id
As a result, the 1989 defiition was expanded to include principal financial
officers, controllers or principal accounting officers, and officers of an issuer's
parent who perform policy making functions for the issuer. Id.
97. 1989 Revised Proposal, supranote 2, at 1343.
98. I&
99. Id- at 1325.
100. 1988 Proposal, supra note 2, at 50,000.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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that persons exercising policy-making functions have routine access to
material non-public information; those without such functions are not
likely to have such access.101 If officers without policy-making functions come into possession of inside information, the SEC believes the
antifraud provisions 10of2 the Act will prohibit abuse of the information
and impose liability.

The release cited Crotty with approval.0 3 Significant for reasons
later developed, the SEC cited Crotty for the proposition that "it is the
duties of an employee ... rather than his corporate title which
determine whether he is an officer."'" The portion deleted originally
05
read "especially his access to inside information.'

IV. SOLIDIFYING THE SUBJECTIVE APPROACH:
THE CROTTY DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
The Second Circuit in Crotty enumerated five arguments supporting
its holding that the duties of an employee, especially his or her access
to inside information, determined whether there was section 16(b)
liability for a person titled as an officer."°
First, the court elaborated that rule 3b-2 did not require imposing
liability merely by virtue of the employee being titled an officer.0 7
Interpreting rule 3b-2 as a flexible guideline, the court relied on the

101. I&
102, Id- Another policy argument set forth in the proposal is that many
companies (72% in one study) already rely on the executive officer definition in
determining officer status for purposes of section 16. 1989 Revised Proposal,
supra note 2, at 1326.
The Commission further cited the harshness of section 16, given the legal
and regulatory developments that had occurred since its enactment, as support
for the revision. 1989 Revised Proposal, supra note 2, at 1326.
103. 1989 Revised Proposal, supranote 2, at 1325. The 1988 proposal cited
the district court decision in Crotty with approval. 1988 Proposal, supra note
2, at 50,000.
104. 1989 Revised Proposal, supra note 2, at 1325.
105. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 567.
106. I& at 567.
107. Id- at 566. This was different than the "momentary assumption" in
Colby that rule 3b-2 was invalid. See supratext accompanying notes 53-55. The
Colby court was acting on it's own, without SEC guidance or legal precedent, in
not literally applying rule 3b-2. But Crottywas acting consistent with the SEC,
which, after Colby, had indicated plainly that a strict application of the rule was
not required. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77 and 94-105.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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1981 and 1988 SEC releases as evidence that the SEC itself did not
believe the rule should be applied rigidly.'(
Second, the majority relied on Colby v. Klune and three other
Second Circuit cases l1 9 as precedent for the proposition that duties
and functions, rather than title, determine officer status."0 Admitting
that Colby involved facts converse to those of the instant case, the court
found that the reasoning of Colby still was applicable."'
The court's third argument involved the precedential value of three
other circuits following a similar approach." 2 Acknowledging that the
Ninth Circuit in Small established that a person's title as officer
automatically brought him or her within section 16(b), the court noted
that Livingston and Small recognized an exception when the title was
merely honorary or ceremonial. 1 3 The majority also cited Winston
and Gold as Sixth and Fourth Circuit cases generally following the
subjective approach."'

108. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 565.
109. Id SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 616-17 (2nd Cir. 1979), vacated on
other grounds, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), held that despite the lack of an executive
title, an employee who participated in management discussions and held
supervisory responsibility was liable potentially under the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933.
In Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 270 F.2d 259, 265
(2d Cir. 1959), the court held that when a corporation issued two series of
preferred stock with different rates and prices, and an insurance company
became owner of 10/o of the issued stock of one series, the insurance company
was not a beneficial owner of 10% of any equity security so as to be a section
16(b) insider. Although the court held that the statute was to be interpreted
literally, it cited Colby as standing for the proposition that corporate labels were
not binding on the court. Id. at 265.
The Crotty opinion also cited Morales v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 366 F. Supp.
760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See supranote 68 and accompanying text for discussion
of this case.
110. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 566.
111. Id. The only justification offered by the court for applying Colby to the
correlative fact situation was that Colby was the law of the circuit. Id.
112. Id. The Crotty court termed its approach as "functional." Id. A more
accurate term for the approach is "access-oriented."
113. Id.
114. Id. The Fourth Circuit actually decided Gold on different grounds than
the lower court. The district court, however, held that a corporate officer with
merely administrative duties was not an insider. Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp.
1211, 1215 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Gold v. Sloan, 786
F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Gold v. Scurlock, 419 U.S. 873
(1974). See supranote 67 and accompanying text for discussion of this decision.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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The majority next concluded that the approach established by Colby
was consistent with that of the Supreme Court in section 16(b)
cases. 11 5
The court cited Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Provident
Securities Co.116 and Kern County Land v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.117 as displaying a preference by the Supreme Court to use
potential access to inside information as the key to liability, instead of
a rigid application of statutory designations. 118 In the only policy
argument expressly advanced, the majority broadly stated that its
interpretation best promoted the goal of curbing short-swing speculation
by corporate insiders." 9
Finally, the panel contended that its approach implemented the
objective standard established in the text of section 16(b). After
emphasizing the importance of an objective standard for this section, the
majority stated that since its approach required no proof of actual
abuse of0 insider information, the objective nature of section 16(b) was
12
served.
Applying the Colby approach to the facts of the case, the court
concluded that Crotty's appointment as vice-president was essentially
honorary in that it was not accompanied by a change in duties or
salary.' 21 More significantly, the court found that Crotty had no
access to inside information before or after the appointment."2 His
complete lack of involvement with and access to the board of directors
was the primary reason for such a finding.'2
The court did admit, however, that the daily revenue receipts to
which Crotty had access might constitute inside information."M But,
because the information was available to major movie exhibitors and
distributors and was contained in daily trade publications, it did not

115. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 566.
116. 423 U.S. 232, 251-54 (1976).
117. 411 U.S. 582, 597-604 (1973).
118. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 566. Both cases involved a pragmatic or subjective
analysis of unorthodox transactions. In Foremost,the Supreme Court held that
the purchase making a person a 10% shareholder cannot be matched against a
subsequent sale to create liability. 423 U.S. at 235. Kern involved a defeated
tender offerer which was forced to exchange its shares because it had insufficient votes to prevent the merger from proceeding. 411 U.S. at 588-90. See
supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
119. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 566-67.
120. Id. at 567.
121. Id
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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provide Crotty an advantage over other investors. 1
Since Crotty's
duties did not give him access to inside information,126
the court held that
the district court's ruling was not clearly erroneous.
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Judge Meskill, in dissent, contended that the plain language of both
section 16(b) and rule 3b-2 required, as a matter of law, a finding that
Crotty, as7 a vice president, was within the purview of the strict liability
12
statute.
Although agreeing that the statute and regulation permitted
liability for a non-officer who was in substance an officer, Judge Meskill
1
interpreted the provisions as not permitting the reverse inference. 2
Asserting that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous,
the dissent found any extraneous consideration irrelevant to the
statute's meaning.'2
The dissent stated that although a pragmatic
approach might be proper for interpreting the outer reaches of section
16,13° officer status cases were routine,
therefore, a pragmatic or
3
subjective approach was unneccessary.1 1
Because the 1981 and 1988 SEC releases, which the majority used
to establish the flexible nature of rule 3b-2, were only proposals and
were not yet in effect, Judge Meskill discounted the release as not
32
necessarily representative of the agency's interpretation of "officer.'
Furthermore, proposed regulations were not necessarily reflective of an
agency's views. 13
Judge Meskill concluded his plain language
defense of rule 3b-2 by claiming that the majority holding wrote the
term "officer" out of the statute 3 4 He argued that "[alt the very least,
the statute should create a presumption that an officer has access to
'
inside information."'

125. Id
126. Idt
127. Id at 568 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
128. Id
129. Id
130. The dissent was obviously referring to the "unorthodox transactions"
cases, as cited by the majority. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
131. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 568.
132. Id
133. Id at 568-69 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986)).
134. Id at 568.
135. I&
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/21
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The second prong of the dissent's attack was that even under the
majority's interpretation, Crotty was an insider."1 Crotty apparently
had complete and autonomous control of 15% to 18% of United Artists'
revenue. Because this gave Crotty responsibility over and knowledge
of the company's financial affairs, Judge Meskill believed Crotty had
access to invaluable information for trading in United Artists stock. 3
The dissent illustrated that knowledge of the number of contracts being
negotiated and the percentage cut from each contract would be
indicative of any changes in United Artists' fortunes." 8 Consistent
with a focus on Crotty's functions and not on the information to which
he had access, Judge Meskill ignored the majority's concern with
Crotty's access to daily revenue receipts."l a
Judge Meskill found the Crotty majority naive in assuming that
only formal interaction with the board of directors provided access to
inside information. 4 ° For the dissent, informal contact, such as the
opportunity to discuss board meetings personally with individual
directors, qualified as access to inside information.14 ' Thus, Judge
Meskill concluded that Crotty's functions, being executive in nature,
to inside information, regardless of whether he actually
gave him access
42
received it'
Finally, the dissent attacked the majority's contention that Crotty's
title was merely honorary because it was unaccompanied by changes in
salary or duties.44 It was possible that Crotty was performing the
duties of an officer before the appointment to vice president and that
Judge Meskill
the appointment was simply de facto recognition.'4
pointing to the lack of evidence presented
supported this argument by 45
that the title was honorary.
V. WILL THE BA'LE RAGE ON?
A. The Subjective Difference
The standard adopted by the Second Circuit in Crotty highlighted
the differences between the approaches of the Second Circuit, Ninth

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 569.
Id at 569-70.
Id.
Id. at 569.
Id-at 570.
Id
Id.
Id
I&
Id
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Circuit and the SEC in determining who is an officer for purposes of
section 16(b). In Crotty, the focus on the employee's access to inside
information was reflected by the court's emphasis on access 40in the
holding, as well as in its application of the holding to the facts.1
The Second Circuit test is clearly subjective, because it prompts
fact-oriented inquiries into which avenues of information the employee
had access, and whether this information constituted inside information.
Such inquiries will vary from court to court; how access is defined will
depend on intangibles, such as political preferences and past experiences. Representative of this is the disagreement between the Crotty
majority and the dissent about whether Crotty's position gave him
access to the board of directors. The majority, refusing to make any
inferences favorable to the plaintiff, considered only formal avenues of
access, while the dissent considered informal avenues of access. Similar
illustrations of the subjectivity of an inquiry into access are the vague
because such a
definitions that courts have offered. This is primarily
147
definition varies according to each fact situation.
The second discernable difference in the approaches is that the
Second Circuit requires the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant employee's duties gave him or her
access to inside information. Besides a subjective query, the Second
The holdings of other
Circuit places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
148
courts place the burden on the defendant.
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in both
Livingston and Small, held that an officer title raised an inference that
the officer had executive duties and access to inside information. To
overcome this inference, the defendant, as opposed to the plaintiff in the
Second Circuit, must prove the title was merely honorary. Determination of honorary status depends on whether the officer had access to

146. After a brief discussion of the honorary nature of Crotty's appointment
to vice president, the court launched into a lengthy discussion of whether the
daily revenue receipts constituted inside information. Id at 567.
147. Each court, depending on its view of section 16(b), will either broadly
or narrowly define inside information. Both the Second and Ninth Circuits
appear to focus on information giving the trader an advantage over other
investors. Crotty referred specifically to financial or operational plans of the
company that gave the individual an advantage. Id. The Ninth Circuit in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Livingston stated that inside
information must be more than just non-public information. 566 F.2d 1119,
1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
148. Crotty, 878 F.2d at 567; see Livingston, 566 F.2d at 1122; Winston v.
Federal Express Corp., 853 F.2d 455, 457 (6th Cir. 1988). The SEC offers no
indication of who has theburden of establishing compliance (or noncompliance)
with the definition. Perhaps no guidance is offered because the nature of a
definition simply requires application.
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inside information. Small, however, requires evidence that the title is
honorary before inquiring into access. Hence, although the Ninth
Circuit imposes the burden on the defendant, the analysis still involves
a subjective inquiry. In Crotty, the Ninth Circuit probably would have
reached the same result as the Second Circuit. The Crotty majority
viewed Crotty's title as honorary and decided that he had no access to
confidential information. In the Ninth Circuit, the defendant would
have overcome the inference of access, as the court likely would have
found that Crotty had
an honorary title because of his lack of access to
14 9
inside information.
Although the Sixth Circuit in Winston embraced a similar approach
as the Ninth Circuit, the presumption of access when the employee is
titled an officer is weightier in the Sixth Circuit. The defendant must
present substantial evidence that there was no possibility of access to
inside information.
This rigorous approach, however, might be
attributable to the uniqueness of the facts in Winston: Winston
admitted he had access and that his title was not honorary. He only
contended that once he stopped working-before the short-swing
transaction was completed-he no longer had access to inside information.' 50 Hence, it is possible the Sixth Circuit would require less from
a defendant in a more routine fact situation.
Representing the objective approach to determining officer status
under section 16(b) is the Commission's proposal to redefine officer
according to executive policy-making functions. Although the revision
reflects the adoption by the SEC of a more flexible approach to officer
determinations, the approach is still objective in comparison to the
access-oriented inquiry performed by the courts. 5 1 The revised rule
apparently assumes that, when the employee has executive policymaking functions, there is access to inside information. This conclusion
is forced by the lack of reference in the definition to access, and the
Commission's statement that "[t]hose exercising a policy-making
function.., have routine access to material non-public informa2
tion.'

5

The SEC's proposed definition of officer appears to operate as a
conclusive presumption, in that if the plaintiff establishes that the

149. The district court in Crotty, when denying Crotty's dismissal and
summary judgment motions, indicated that Crotty might be an insider under the
Ninth Circuit approach as set forth in Livingston. Crotty, 663 F. Supp. at 447.
150. Winston, 853 F.2d at 457.
151. The conflict between the Commission and the courts was originally
"title versus function." See supratextaccompanying notes 47-60, discussingrule
3b-2 and Colby. The conflict has moved to a lower, more subjective ground, and
now involves the performance of duties versus access to inside information.
152. 1988 Proposal, supra note 2 at 50,000.
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defendant's duties are of an executive nature, then it is conclusively
presumed that the defendant is an officer for section 16(b) purposes. If
the plaintiff fails to establish duties of an executive type, then the
presumption never arises, and section 16(b) liability cannot be imposed.
Of course, this analysis, that the proposed definition of officer assumes
access and operates as a conclusive presumption, is merely speculative. 15 However, such an assessment is consistent with both the
Commission's hesitancy toward inquiring into an officer's access to
inside information, and the SEC's desire for an objective definition that
offers certainty in application.
The SEC approach is objective because certain officers Ir are
automatically deemed liable solely because of their titles. In this
situation, any factual analysis is irrelevant. A second reason for
deeming the SEC approach objective is because it avoids inquiring into
access to information and resolving whether information is inside
information. Determining job functions is easier and requires fewer
inferences than deciding whether information is confidential. For
example, determining whether gross daily revenue receipts is the type
of information that gives a trader a significant advantage over other
investors is an extremely difficult task. On the other hand, job
functions and policy-making roles usually are identified easily and
understood. Indeed, deciding whether an employee has access to insider
information, as opposed to labeling job functions, involves a greater
exercise of discretion by the trier of fact.
The SEC offers no indication of what evidence is required to prove
that an officer did engage in policy-making functions to impose the
conclusive presumption that he or she was an officer with access to
inside information. The only indication available is that the dissenting
judge in Crotty, who adopted a similar approach of presuming access to
inside information if the duties were of an executive flavor, willingly
found that Crotty's duties were of a nature providing access to inside
information. 5
The dissent viewed Crotty's duties in a manner
favorable to imposing liability. Judge Meskill argued that Crotty's

153. Rule 3b-7, the origin of the proposed officer definition, provides no
indication of how the definition operates in application. The rule, which defines
"executive officer," is used for various filing determinations. 1988 Proposal,
supra note 2, at 50,000.
154. The revised rule states that "officer" means an issuer's "president,
principal financial officer, controller or principal accounting officer, and any vicepresident in charge of a principal business unit, division or functions such as
sales, administration or finance." 1989 Revised Proposal, supranote 2, at 1343.
155. For example, the dissent viewed Crotty's involvement with and
knowledge of United Artists' contract negotiations as a duty providing access to
valuable information. See supratext accompanying notes 136-39.
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appointment might simply have been recognition of officer duties he
already was performing. The majority was unwilling to imply such a
fact. If the dissenting approach is indeed an indication of the Commission's new position, the SEC apparently will require substantial
evidence of the non-executive nature of a defendant's duties. This is in
sharp contrast to the Second Circuit standard which imposes on the
plaintiff the burden of proving that the defendant's position provided
access to confidential information.
B.

The F7uture of the Revised Definition

Crotty represents the established pattern among the courts of using
the subjective approach to determine officer status. The Commission,
by proposing a less objective definition of officer, obviously is attempting
156
to accommodate the policies served by a subjective approach.
Despite a valiant effort by the SEC, there are still significant differences
between the two approaches. Although agreeing to a single definition
would advance the goals of section 16(b), it is unlikely, for reasons
outlined below, that such an agreement between the courts and the SEC
will be reached.
Several benefits would be gained by resolving the objective and
subjective differences and adopting a uniform approach to determining
officer status. The confusion generated by having two approaches
creates uncertainty, and results in inconsistent section 16(a) reporting
positions by officers of different corporations. The uncertainty might
even cause differing liability results under section 16(b). 157 The lack
of clarity contributes to the high rate of delinquency in filing under
section 16(a). 1' Furthermore, unnecessary litigation could be avoided
if parties were certain of the standard applied by the courts. Easier and
more consistent enforcement by the SEC would result if there was less
confusion associated with officer liability. 59
Each of these reasons alone can strengthen the operation of section
16(b). The section was designed to curb the abuse of confidential

156. 1988 Proposal, supra note 2, at 50,000. It is ironic that it is the SEC
attempting to accommodate the courts, given the Commission's apparent
authority to issue a rule defining officer. See infranotes 171-73 and accompanying text for discussion of the authority of the SEC to define officer.
157. Committee on FederalRegulation of Securities,supranote 11, at 1107.
158. In 1988, 37% of required transaction reports were delinquent. 1988
Proposal, supra note 2, at 50,000.
159. The Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC receives more requests
for interpretive and no-action advice concerning section 16 than in any other
area. Id. at 49,999.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 21
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Although each approach 10is1
information by corporate insiders.' 6
claimed to be better than the other at implementing this purpose,
the goal of combating insider trading would be served most effectively
by resolving the differences. Both approaches obviously achieve certain
objectives, but the conflict negates the advancement of any policy. It is
alter their
unlikely, however, for several reasons, that the courts 0will
2
position to adopt the Commission's proposed definition.
.The validity of rule 3b-2 would probably never have been doubted
10 3
Inbut for the "momentary assumption" of invalidity by Colby.
stead, the courts have given only lip-service to the position of the SEC
on determination of officer status. The Commission's 1981 release,
which supported focusing on job functions instead of job titles, went
unmentioned in the opinions of the Ninth and Sixth Circuits in Small
and Winston. Although the Second Circuit in Crotty recognized the 1981
and 1988 SEC releases, it did so only to justify the assertion that rule
3b-2 was a flexible guideline. Other courts have construed Colby almost
Armed with precedent ignoring
as if it had held the rule invalid."3
the Commission's rule-making authority on the issue, future courts have
even less incentive to consider Commission positions. Any revision of
the definition of officer, even one attempting to accommodate the values
of the courts, is likely to be unnoticed and receive the same treatment
as rule 3b-2.
Because courts generally disapprove of the harshness associated
with section 16(b) liability, they are unlikely to adopt the straightforward and objective definition of officer proposed by the SEC.
According to the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities:
By taking an unabashedly prophylactic approach, section 16 imposes
liability on many transactions that contain no elements of the abuses
that Congress sought to eliminate. It can create unwarranted
restrictions for insiders who arbitrarily are prevented from trading

160. See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
161. For policy reasons supporting implementation of the SEC executive
officer definition, see Committee on FederalRegulation6f Securities, supranote
11, at 1105-07; A.L.I., FED. SEC. CODE § 269 (Tent. Draft I 1972). See Wentz,
supranote 15, at 253-55 for arguments favoring the subjective approach.
162. Because the 1989 proposal was a republication of the 1988 proposal,
and because it had very few changes, the definition as proposed in 1989 likely
will be enacted in 1990.
163. Comment, supranote 13, at 752.
164. Morales v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 760, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(statute as interpreted by rule 3b-2 "clear," but Colby put "gloss" on meaning of
"officer" requiring factual inquiry); Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd, 365 F.
Supp. 1268, 1270 (E.D.Pa. 1973) (validity of rule "has not been clearly established").
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even when they do not possess information that is confidential.. .i
Section 16(b) has been attacked also on economic grounds. Many
economists contend that "speculative trading by insiders may-%be
beneficial in an 'economic' sense."'"
It has been argued that section
16(b) is ineffectual in preventing insider trading and does not even
address all the ways in which insider trades can be perpetrated.
Finally, courts and critics who dislike section 16(b) contend that the
development of the insider trading doctrine under rule 10b-5 of section
6 7
10 has rendered section 16(b) obsolete.
This disapproval of section 16(b) has been a primary reason for
adopting a subjective approach. The courts believe such a test more
effectively and more fairly curbs insider trading."6
A subjective,
access-oriented inquiry is more flexible nd allows for more discretion;
the courts use this discretion to shape section 16(b) to their liking.
Although the proposed revisions may accommodate some of the
complaints registered by the courts, it must be assumed that the
distaste of the judiciary for section 16(b) will persist. 169 Thus, the
revised definition will meet with skepticism, and given its objective

165. Committee on FederalRegulation of Securities, supranote 11, at 109091 (footnote omitted).
166. Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of The Securities ExchangeAct
of 1934, 68 CoLuM. L. REV. 260, 269 (1968); see also H. MANNa, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Hetherington, Insider Tradingand the
Logic of the Law, 1967 WIs. L. REv.720.
Needless to say, however, the economists are not of one persuasion. See,
e.g., Cox, Insider Tradingand Contracting: A CriticalResponse to the "Chicago
School", 1986 DuKE L.J. 628; Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading
Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470 (1969). Compare Manne, Insider Trading
and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REv. 547 (1970) with Ferber, -The Case
Against Insider Trading: A.Response to ProfessorManne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621
(1970) with Manne, A Rejoinder to Mr. Ferber,23 VAND. L. REV. 627 (1970).
167. A.L.I., supranote 161, at 751-52.
168. According to the majority in Crotty, the subjective approach "best
serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate
insiders." Crotty, 878 F.2d at 566-67 (quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972)).
169. As evidence of this assumption, consider the Second Circuit's reaction
in Crotty. The revisions released in 1988 were cited by the court. Crotty, 878
F.2d at 565-66. Nevertheless, the court did not consider the substance of the
revisions, but relied only on the revisions to justify not applying rule 3b-2. See
supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
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flavor, reproposed rule 16a-l(f)170 probably will not be adopted by the
courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Crotty represented an opportunity to resolve the differences existing
between the approaches of the SEC and the courts in determining officer
status for purposes of section 16(b). The Second Circuit, however, chose
instead to apply a subjective approach in determining Crotty's officer
status. By focusing on Crotty's lack of access to inside information, the
court found him outside the scope of section 16(b), and therefore, not
liable. The SEC responded to Crotty by revising its definition of officer.
Although the revision is less objective than rule 3b-2, it still differs
significantly from and is more objective than the approach of Crotty.
Because of both dislike for section 16(b) and precedent, it is unlikely
that courts will adopt the more, objective approach advocated by the
SEC. For reasons unrelated to the policy of uniformity, the courts
should take the opportunity to adopt the new SEC definition of officer.
Although the courts have ignored the rule-making authority of the
SEC in the past, Congress did specifically grant the Commission the
power to define a term such as officer. This conclusion can be drawn
from both section *(b) and section 23(a)(1) of the Act. 17 1 Louis Loss,
in his treatise on securities regulation, stated: "It seems difficult to
understand how there could be any serious question about the validity
of the Commission's rule [3b-2], or the near-binding effect of its
interpretation of the rule under orthodox principles of administrative
law.'0 72 It would appear that Congress implicitly intended to leave to
the SEC the power to determine the definition of officer. As one
commentator has noted:

170. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 16.
172. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1094 (2d ed. 1961) (footnote
omitted). In SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Inst. Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1070, 1081
(D.D.C. 1984) (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54
(1978)), the court stated:
It is important to note that the Commission's interpretation of its
statutes and regulations are entitled to substantial deference. The
Supreme Court has long held that "[s]uch deference is particularly
appropriate where ...Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of [an agency's] status or objectives. Unless and until
Congress does so we are reluctant to disturb a longstanding administrative policy that comports with the plain language, history, and
prophylactic purpose of the Act."
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That this was a conscious decision is supported by the fact that
Congress did take care to define other terms, for example "director,"
in the Exchange Act. Further, Congress left the definition of officer
to the SEC under other securities statutes, supporting the inference
that the omission of the definition from the statute was consciously
intended by the drafters and Congress. Evidence that the SEC took
care to follow the purpose and spirit of the statute is given by the

structure and language of the rule which closely follows the statutory
definition of director. It therefore is reasonable to assert that the rule
is within the power of the SEC under the Exchange Act, that it
follows the intent of Congress, and thus, is a legally binding rule. 3
A second reason the courts should follow the objective definition
proposed by the SEC is that the definition can effectively and fairly
combat insider trading. The revised definition is the result of compromising the Commission's rigid objectivity with the subjectivity urged by
the judiciary. The new rule mitigates much of the harshness of section
16(b) complained of by the courts, while still providing the certainty
favored by the SEC. Many companies already look to the executive
officer definition in determining officer status for section 16 purposes. 7 4 Employees exercising a policy-making function, by the very
nature of that responsibility, have routine access to confidential
information; hence, the substance of the courts' test is satisfied. The
revision is a compromise, and given the dangers associated with a
nonuniform approach, adoption of the proposal is clearly the desirable
result.
The revisions offered by the SEC represent a renewed effort to
combat insider trading by corporate insiders. Indeed, the proposals
stand for the proposition that section 16 "occupies an important place
in the arsenal of weapons provided by Congress to combat insider
trading abuse and speculation.' 7 5 If the courts respect the judgment
of the SEC with regard to issues such as the definition of officer, section
16 can continue to fight in the war against insider trading.

PHILIP J. BOEOKMA4

173. Comment, supranote 13, at 752-53 (footnotes omitted).
174. See supranote 102.
175. Committee on FederalRegulation of Securities, supranote 11, it 1135.
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